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"I'M NOT DEAD YET!": AN ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT




The classic comedy Monty Python and the Holy Grail1 begins with a
humorous scene in which a cart driver meanders up and down the streets
and alleyways of a Medieval English village collecting the dead bodies of
those who succumbed to the bubonic plague. As the cart driver chants
"bring out your dead," he is stopped by a large man carrying a rather frail
looking old man over his shoulder.2 However, before the frail old man is
thrown upon the heap of dead bodies he protests, "I'm not dead yet" in a
last ditched effort to avoid being carted off with the other dead bodies.3
The outlandish exchange that occurs in the opening scenes of the movie,
when taken in whole, is quite humorous. The idea of passing off a living
person as dead is quite absurd and makes for great comedic relief. How-
ever, due to a pair of recent Mississippi Supreme Court decisions, the hu-
morous opening scene no longer appears as far fetched as it once did.
These two Mississippi Supreme Court decisions have drastically and
detrimentally altered beneficiaries' rights under the Mississippi wrongful
death statute.4 The judicial reinterpretation of the wrongful death statute
began with Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust Inc., wherein the Court re-
treated from 149 years of contrary precedent, and for the first time held
that the time for bringing a wrongful death action is limited by when the
underlying injury occurred.5 Then, before the ink could dry on the Jenkins
opinion, the Court handed down its decision in Cleveland v. Mann.6 In
Cleveland, the Court relied upon its recent decision in Jenkins and disre-
garded wrongful death beneficiaries' constitutional rights to open courts by
binding the beneficiaries to an arbitration agreement which none of them
had neither signed nor seen.7
These recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Mississippi are a case
study in judicial activism. In Jenkins and Cleveland, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court paid no heed to the plain language of the statute, the legisla-
tive intent, the canons of statutory construction, and fundamental judicial
* J.D. Mississippi College School of Law 2007. The author is currently an Associate at the
Eaves Law Firm in Jackson, Mississippi.
1. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures 1974).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972).
5. Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust Inc., 933 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 2006).
6. Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 2006).
7. Id. at 113.
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maxims such as stare decisis, not to mention wrongful death beneficiaries'
constitutional rights to due process and open courts.8 Moreover, there was
no crisis or uncertainty in the law prior to the Court's decisions to justify its
departure; rather, the law at the time surrounding the wrongful death stat-
ute was firm and unchanging. However, and quite unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi's decisions in Jenkins and Cleveland have
turned a stable area of the law on its head and, in so doing, have called 149
years of prior precedent into question.
II. HISTORY OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE IN MISSISSIPPI
The Mississippi wrongful death statute created a new cause of action
unknown to the common law. 9 Prior to the enactment of its wrongful
death statute, Mississippi adhered to the common law rule allowing for re-
covery of damages where injury was negligently inflicted on a person; how-
ever, upon the death of the injured person the right to recover died with
the person. 10 The maxim action personalis moritur cum persona or "a per-
sonal action dies with the person" summed up this common law idea." In
an effort to bring an end to the harsh rule that had developed, the English
Parliament enacted in 1846 the Fatal Accidents Act, which is now more
commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act.'2 The English Act did away
with the harsh common law result. 3 The new Act created a new cause of
action which stated that wherever a wrongful act caused the death of an-
other person, the decedent's executor or administrator could bring an ac-
tion for the benefit of certain relatives. 4
Soon after Parliament enacted Lord Campbell's Act, jurisdictions in
the United States began enacting similar legislation beginning in 1847 with
New York.' 5 Mississippi joined its sister states ten years later in 1857 when
it enacted its first wrongful death statute.16 Mississippi's first wrongful
death statute contained within the act its own limitations provision. The
8. Id. at 108; Jenkins, 933 So. 2d at 923.
9. Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss. 1992), overruled in part by Jenkins v. Pensa-
cola Health Trust Inc., 933 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 2006).
10. Gentry, 606 So. 2d at 1120.
11. Id. The common law rule barring recovery where death ensued is thought to have originated
with Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808), wherein he held: "In a civil
court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." See T.A. Smedley, Wrong-
ful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAN. L. REV. 605, 613 (1960). However, as pointed out
by Justice Dickinson in his majority opinion in Long v. McKinney, 897 So. 2d 160, 179 (Miss. 2004),
prior to the Baker decision there was English common law precedent for wrongful death claims. For a
discussion of the English common law history leading up to Baker v. Bolton, see William S. Bailey,
Flawed Justice. Limitation of Parental Remedies for the Loss of Consortium of Adult Children, 27 SEAT-
TLE U.L. REV. 941, 949-55 (2004).




16. Bussey v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 31 So. 2d 212, 213 (Miss. 1901); see Miss. CODE ch. 61, art 48
(1857) (which provided "Whenever the death of any person shall be caused by any such wrongful or
negligent act, or omission, as would if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or damaged
thereby, to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof... the person or corporation, or
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final clause of the statute provided, "every such action shall be commenced
within one year after the death of such deceased person.' 17 The limitations
provision contained in the Code of 1857 had the distinction of being clear
and simple to apply. The statute clearly stated that upon the death of a
person the limitations period began to run. Therefore, the role of the
courts was a simple one: if a plaintiff did not bring their action within one
year of the decedent's death, the action was not timely and dismissal was
appropriate. After the original enactment of the wrongful death statute in
1857, the legislature subsequently amended and added to the statute; how-
ever, the one year limitations provision persisted up through the enactment
of the Mississippi Code of 1906.18
In 1908 the Mississippi Legislature again amended the wrongful death
statute and eliminated the one year limitations period. 9 At the time of the
1908 amendment, Mississippi was the only state in the Union to entirely
eliminate its limitation provision from its wrongful death statute.20 After
the legislature removed the limitation provision from the wrongful death
statute, the general limitations provision found in section 3097 of the Code
of 1906 controlled the timeliness of wrongful death actions.21 The perti-
nent language of importance within section 3097 is the action must be
brought "within six years next after the cause of action accrued."22 The
questioned of when does the statute of limitations in wrongful death ac-
tions begin to run turned on the interpretation of the word "accrued." The
Mississippi Supreme Court in 1935 noted that the word "accrue" has a
fixed legal meaning; specifically, accrue means "to come into existence as
an enforceable claim."23 Thus, at the time the legislature removed the ex-
press one year limitation, the contemporary legal thought was that the stat-
ute of limitations began to run when the wrongful death action came into
existence as an enforceable claim.
The question, therefore, turned upon the determination of when did
the wrongful death action come into existence as an enforceable claim.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi answered that question in Edward Hines
Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart.24 Therein, the Court favorably cited a
both, that would have been liable if death had not ensued, and the representatives of such person, shall
be liable for the damages, nothwithstanding the death.").
17. Miss. CODE ch. 61, art. 48 (1857).
18. See Miss. CODE REV. ch. 8 § 676 (1871); Miss. CODE REV. ch. 58 § 1510 (1880); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 663 (1892); Miss. CODE ANN. § 721 (1906).
19. MISS. CODE ch. 167 (1908).
20. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Bradley, 69 So. 666, 669 (Miss. 1915).
21. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3097 (1906) ("All actions for which no other period of limitation is pre-
scribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after."); see
Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So. 2d 491, 492 (Miss. 1983) (stating that since 1908 all wrongful
death actions have been governed by the six-year statute of limitations found in Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-
1-49), overruled in part by Anderson v. R & D Foods, Inc., 913 So. 2d 394 (Miss. App. Apr. 26, 2005).
22. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3097 (1906).
23. Grenada Bank v. Petty, 164 So. 316, 318 (Miss. 1935); see also Forman v. Mississippi Publish-
ers Corp., 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1943) ("[A] cause of action 'accrues' when it comes into existence as
an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.").
24. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart, 100 So. 12 (Miss. 1924).
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United States Supreme Court decision based upon the Federal Employers'
Liability Act where it held that upon a person's death "his injury created a
new and distinct right of action for the benefit of the dependent relatives
named in the statute. '2 5 Furthermore, Chief Justice Ethridge, while dis-
senting on other grounds, expressly noted that "the right of the [benefi-
ciaries] does not accrue under the statute at all until death results from the
injuries. "26
As early as 1924, it was clear a wrongful death action accrued, for stat-
ute of limitations purposes, upon the death of the decedent. The removal
by the legislature of the express one-year limitations provision did not af-
fect the State's wrongful death jurisprudence. Because the Supreme Court
of Mississippi continued to adhere to the rule that a wrongful death action
accrues upon the person's death, the only effect the 1908 amendment had
on wrongful death jurisprudence was to substitute a six year statute of limi-
tations for the previous one year limitations statute.27
A. Death Acts Versus Survival Acts
After 1924, ruling courts throughout Mississippi continued to adhere
to the rule that a wrongful death action accrued upon a person's death.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi continued to adhere to the rule that a wrongful death action accrued
at the time of the decedent's death. Rather, a simple analysis of the history
of the Mississippi wrongful death statute demonstrates that the answer
reached was the only appropriate answer.
Dean Prosser instructed in his treatise on torts that there are two dif-
ferent models states have used in creating their respective wrongful death
acts.28 The first type of act, modeled after Parliament's Lord Campbell's
Act, is commonly referred to as a death act.29 These statutes created a new
cause of action upon the decedent's death in favor of the beneficiaries
named in the statute.3 ° On the other hand, a minority of states chose to
enact survival acts. Survival acts did not create a new cause of action,
rather, a survival action was "the cause of action held by the decedent im-
mediately before or at death, now transferred to his personal representa-
tive."' 31 Thus, two competing theories of recovery were created by the
states which had an underlying and fundamental difference. Survival acts
allowed for the survival of actions which had already "vested" in the dece-
dent, while death acts created a new cause of action. This central differ-
ence is important in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's instruction
25. Id. at 13 (citing American R.R. Co. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145 (1913)).
26. Id. at 15 (Ethridge, C.J., dissenting).
27. Miss. CODE ch. 167 (1908).
28. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
29. PROSSER & KEETON, § 127 at 946.
30. Id.
31. PROSSER & KEETON, § 126 at 942.
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that a cause of action accrues, and thus a statute of limitation begins to run,
when the right to sue vests.32
When Mississippi created its first wrongful death statute in 1857, it
chose to follow the death act model of Lord Campbell's Act. This is be-
cause, prior to the enactment of its first wrongful death statute, Mississippi
had in place a statute which already provided for the survival of certain
actions. In 1848, the Mississippi Legislature enacted a law which allowed
executors, administrators, or collectors to prosecute certain actions "which
the testator or intestate might have commenced and prosecuted. ' 33 How-
ever, the 1848 survival act expressly prohibited the survival of certain ac-
tions in tort and all torts to the person.34 The wrongful death statute,
enacted nine years later, filled the void, but only to the extent that it al-
lowed for recovery for a personal tort which caused death to the dece-
dent.35  To fill this gap, the legislature, contemporaneously with the
enactment of the wrongful death statute, enacted a separate provision
which allowed executors, administrators, or collectors to "commence and
prosecute any personal action whatever . . . which the testator or intestate
might have commenced and prosecuted."36 Therefore, after the 1857 en-
actments, the wrongful death statute created a new cause of action for the
statutory beneficiaries to recover whenever another's wrongful act resulted
in death to the decedent.37 The survival statute allowed for the survival of
any claim, which the decedent did in fact commence or any the decedent
might have commenced, to the decedent's executor or administrator which
did not proximately cause the decedent's death.38
In 1944, the Mississippi Supreme Court for the first time expressly
stated what had been recognized but not yet affirmatively stated: the Mis-
sissippi wrongful death statute "is not one of survival but creates a new and
independent cause of action."39 Moreover, the Court had previously held
the right of action belonged to the beneficiaries under the wrongful death
statute.40 Following then that the wrongful death statute created a new
cause of action that belonged solely to the named beneficiaries, the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi continued to follow the rule that the statute of
32. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1943).
33. HUTCHINSON'S MIss. CODE ch. 49, art. 1 § 111 (Miss. 1848).
34. Id.
35. Miss. CODE REV. ch. 61, art. 48 (1857).
36. Miss. CODE REV ch. 61, art. 119 (1857). This statute also contained a clause which allowed
for the executor, administrator, or collector to maintain actions which accrue in the course of adminis-
tration. These two rights remained codified in the same section of the code until 1880. In the Code of
1880 the two actions were separated and remain separated today under the modern enactments. The
Code of 1880 § 2078 described the survival of certain actions which is found today in Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 91-7-233 (1972). While § 2081 of the Code of 1880 described actions which accrue during administra-
tion which today is found in Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-231 (1972).
37. Miss. CODE REV ch. 61, art. 48 (1857).
38. Miss. CODE REV ch. 60, art. 119 (1857).
39. Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 17 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1944); Hawkins v. Rye, 101 So. 2d 516,
521 (Miss. 1958); see also Thames v. Mississippi, 117 F.2d 949, 951 (5th Cir. 1941).
40. Hawkins, 101 So. 2d at 521(quoting Mississippi Power Co. v. Archibald, 196 So. 760, 762
(Miss. 1940) ("In other words, it is their right of action.")).
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limitations, for wrongful death purposes, accrued and therefore began to
run upon the death of the decedent.
B. Medical Malpractice and the Wrongful Death Act: Take One
In 1967, the Mississippi Supreme Court for the first time addressed
whether in a wrongful death action based on medical negligence the cause
of action accrues on the date of the negligent act or upon the death of the
victim.41 In response to the question presented, a unanimous Court held
that since the plaintiff had pled his complaint in the form of a wrongful
death action, the limitations period would begin to run from the date of the
death.42 In support of its decision, the Court quoted the general rule that
"the date of death is controlling, even under those statutes which speak
only of the accrual of the action."43 The first time the option of applying a
different limitations period to wrongful death actions predicated upon
medical negligence presented itself to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, a
unanimous Court declined the invitation to do so. Instead, the Court con-
tinued to adhere to the rule long since followed that the limitations period
in wrongful death actions begins to run upon the date of death. 4
Just over ten years later, Partyka v. Yazoo Development Corp.
presented the Mississippi Supreme Court with a factual situation in which a
husband and wife were involved in a horrific car accident in which, al-
though they were both killed, the wife survived her husband for roughly
thirty minutes.45 The Court found that at the moment her husband died
she "had a cause of action for his wrongful death. '46 In support of this
conclusion, the Court favorably cited a factually similar Kansas case which
concluded that a cause of action for wrongful death accrued to the
survivor.4 7
After holding the cause of action accrued in the wife at the time of her
husband's death, the Court addressed a related issue of whether a person
who dies testate can circumvent the statute through one's testamentary
will. The Court rejected this proposition based upon three premises. First,
a person cannot devise or bequeath through their will something they do
not have.48 Second, the court explained that "[t]he wrongful death statute
creates, a new and independent cause of action in favor of those named in
the statute."49 Finally, since the wrongful death cause of action is created
41. Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1967), overruled by Williams v. Kil-
gore, 618 So. 2d 51 (Miss. 1992).
42. Smith, 196 So. 2d at 93.
43. Id. (quoting M.C. Dransfield, Time From Which Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against
Cause of Action for Wrongful Death, 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1153 (1964)).
44. Id. (citing Pickens v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 45 So. 868 (Miss. 1908)).
45. Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979).
46. Id. at 648.
47. Id. at 650 (citing White v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 265 P. 73 (Kan. 1928)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook., 17 So. 2d 791 (Miss. 1944)).
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upon death, it cannot be a part of the estate of the deceased and accord-
ingly cannot be devised or bequeathed.5" In so finding, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court continued to adhere to the principles which had underlined
the Court's wrongful death jurisprudence for over one-hundred years.
C. Medical Malpractice and the Wrongful Death Act: Take Two
Although the law on the running of the statute of limitations for
wrongful death appeared settled, the Mississippi Supreme Court once
again addressed the issue in Gentry v. Wallace.5 The Gentry court for the
second time addressed when the statute of limitations for wrongful death
purposes begins to run when the underlying tort was medical malpractice.
Once again the Court came to the conclusion that the wrongful death
"cause of action does not accrue" and the statute of limitations does not
begin to run "until the death of the negligently injured person."52
The Court based its decision in Gentry upon history, precedent, and
legal construction of the wrongful death statute. The majority analyzed the
legal lineage of the wrongful death statute in Mississippi back to the Lord
Campbell's Act of Parliament. 3 In so doing, the Gentry court kept an eye
toward its prior jurisprudence concerning when the statute of limitations
accrued. The Court implored, "[a] cause of action accrues only when it
comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when the right to sue
becomes vested."5 4 Based on this premise, the result arrived at by the
Court is obvious because "[a] cause of action must exist and be complete
before an action can be commenced." 55 Because the wrongful death stat-
ute created a new cause of action in favor of the beneficiaries, the cause of
action created cannot vest until the decedent dies. In so finding, the Gentry
court continued to adhere to the long held rule in Mississippi that the cause
of action for wrongful death vests; therefore, the statute of limitations be-
gins to run only upon the death of the injured person.
56
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed the issue
of the appropriate venue in wrongful death actions in McMillan v. Puck-
ett.57 In addition to no longer providing a statute of limitations, the wrong-
ful death statute also lacked a venue provision. As such, the general venue
provision found in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 applied to wrongful death
50. Id. (citing Byars v. Austin, 218 So. 2d 11, 15 (Miss. 1969)).
51. Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1992), overruled by Jenkins v. Pensacola Health
Trust Inc., 933 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 2006).
52. Gentry, 606 So. 2d at 1119.
53. Id. at 1120.
54. Id. at 1121 (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990)).
55. Id. (citing Owens, 573 So. 2d at 706).
56. Id. at 1123. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reiterated its holdings in Gentry, 606 So. 2d at
1117, and Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1967), just two years later in Sweeney
v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 335 (Miss. 1994), wherein the Court sitting en banc, "reaffirmed our recogni-
tion that wrongful death and medical negligence are two separate and distinct causes of action." The
Court went on to specifically state that "the statute of limitations was triggered by death," and the
Court reiterated its holding that "a cause of action does not accrue until an injury occurs." Id.
57. McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1996).
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actions. 58 The pertinent language in § 11-11-3 provided that venue is ap-
propriate "where the cause of action may occur or accrue."' 59 In interpret-
ing the statute, the Court sought guidance from its wrongful death
decisions discussing when such actions accrue for statute of limitations pur-
poses.6" In so doing, the Court reiterated its prior holdings that "a cause of
action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim."'"
Moreover, the Court cautioned that "a cause of action must exist and be
complete before an action can be commenced, and when a suit is begun
before the cause of action accrues, it will generally be dismissed if proper
objection is made."62
Thus, the Court determined that the appropriate venue in wrongful
death actions may be both where the alleged act of negligence occurred
and where the death occurred or the action accrued.63 Of particular inter-
est in the McMillan decision is Justice Bank's dissent wherein he stated,
"the cause of action 'accrues' to the statutory beneficiaries when the death
occurs."64 Notably, Justice Bank, although he disagreed with the Court's
interpretation in regards to venue, agreed with the fact that the temporal
accrual of wrongful death actions was only upon the date of the injured
person's death, not the date the wrongful act occurred.65
Three years after McMillan, the Supreme Court refined its interpreta-
tion of the applicable statute of limitations with regards to wrongful death
in Thiroux v. Austin.6 6 The Thiroux court, while for the first time acknowl-
edging the lack of an express statute of limitation for the wrongful death
statute, held "a wrongful death action, since it is predicated on an underly-
ing tort, is limited by the statute of limitation applicable to the tort result-
ing in the wrongful death."67 Therefore, after Thiroux, the statute of
limitations for wrongful death purposes would be one year if the underly-
ing tort was an intentional tort, 68 two years if the underlying tort was medi-
cal malpractice,69 or three years for ordinary negligence or other torts not
otherwise accounted for.7" However, while Thiroux changed the applicable
limitations period for certain wrongful death actions, nothing in the
Thiroux opinion changed the underlying rule that for statute of limitations
purposes a wrongful death action accrued upon the death of the injured
person.
58. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (1972).
59. McMillan, 678 So. 2d at 654 (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (1972)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 655 (citing Forman v. Mississippi Publishers, Corp., 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1943)).
62. Id. (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990)).
63. Id. at 656. See also id. at 653 ("In this, as in any other wrongful death action brought pursu-
ant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972), there is no injury, and hence, no cause of action until a death
occurs.").
64. Id. at 658 (Banks, J., dissenting).
65. McMillan, 678 So. 2d at 658.
66. Thiroux ex rel. Cruz v. Austin ex rel. Ascenequx, 749 So. 2d 1040 (Miss. 1999).
67. Id. at 1042.
68. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972).
69. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1972).
70. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972).
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D. A Single Recovery for a Double Wrong
In 2003, the Mississippi Court of Appeals once again addressed the
issue of whether a decedent could circumvent distribution set forth in the
wrongful death through his will.71 While continuing to adhere to the rule
that a person cannot circumvent the wrongful death statute through his
will, the Mississippi Court of Appeals gave an excellent analysis of the fun-
damentally different purposes behind the wrongful death statute and the
survival statute. The Court began with the familiar proposition that the
"wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action in favor of the statu-
tory beneficiaries. '72 Furthermore, the purpose behind the wrongful death
statute is to "compensate the statutory wrongful death heirs for their losses
resulting from the death. '73 This is opposed to a suit for a personal injury
where "the damages are intended to compensate the injured person for the
injuries sustained. 74 Thus, the fundamental difference between a personal
injury action and a wrongful death action is what the actions are intended
to compensate for.
The Court explained that Mississippi's survival statute 75 allows the ad-
ministrator or executor of the estate to commence "any personal action
which the decedent may have commenced and prosecuted. '76 Thus, if the
decedent had at the time of his or her death a viable claim for a personal
injury, which did not proximately cause the death, that claim would survive
the person's death and the estate could prosecute the claim. However, the
fundamental purpose behind the personal injury action would remain, to
compensate the injured person for their injuries suffered.
On the other hand, when the personal injury proximately caused the
decedent's death, the action becomes one for wrongful death.77 The court
of appeals explained that the language of the wrongful death statute en-
compasses "any damages for personal injuries suffered by the decedent
during her lifetime."' 78 Moreover, at the instant in which the wrongful con-
tact results in death, the wrongful death statute encompasses the action for
personal injury, and the action for personal injury is no longer actionable
under the survival statute.79 Thus, the Court instructed that when there is
doubt as to whether the wrongful act proximately caused the decedent's
death, the proper procedure is to bring both a wrongful death action and a
71. In re Estate of England, 846 So. 2d 1060 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
72. Id. at 1067 (citing Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp, 376 So. 2d 646, 650 (Miss. 1979)).
73. Id. at 1066 (citing Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss. 1992)).
74. Id.
75. MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233 (1994).
76. In re Estate of England, 846 So. 2d at 1067 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233 (1994)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1068. See Gatlin v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 772 So. 2d 1023, 1030-31 (Miss. 2000) ("This
statutory language has been held to include funeral and medical expenses of the decedent, the present
net cash value of the life expectancy of the decedent, the loss of companionship of the decedent, the
pain and suffering experienced by the deceased between the time of the injury and the subsequent
demise, and punitive damages.") (citation omitted).
79. Id.
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survival action against the tortfeasor.8° In a case in which there is doubt as
to whether the conduct proximately caused the death, it is for the jury to
decide whether the act proximately caused the death. 81 However, if the
jury determines the conduct did cause the death, then the survival action is
cast aside and damages are awarded under the wrongful death statute.82
The court of appeals decision in In re Estate of England was in line
with Mississippi Supreme Court precedent which discussed the purposes
behind the award of damages in wrongful death actions. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Estate of Jones v. Howell instructed that the purpose
of the wrongful death statute is "to compensate the beneficiary for the loss
of companionship and society of the deceased, the pain and suffering of the
decedent between the time of injury and death, and punitive damages.
83
The idea that the wrongful death statute serves a dual purpose, to compen-
sate for the wrong to the injured person, as well as, to compensate for the
wrong to the beneficiaries, is hardly a novel idea in Mississippi. The origins
can be traced back to 1924, wherein the Mississippi Supreme Court favora-
bly referenced a United States Supreme Court opinion that explored the
dual purposes of the wrongful death statute.84 The Mississippi Supreme
Court explained that the wrongful death statute serves two purposes,
"[o]ne is for the wrong to the injured person and is confined to his personal
loss and suffering before he died, while the other is for the wrong to the
beneficiaries and is confined to their pecuniary loss through death."85
Stated more eloquently, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained, "[o]ne
begins where the other ends, and a recovery upon both in the same action
is not a double recovery for a single wrong but a single recovery for a
double wrong."'8 6 In so stating, the Court made it clear that recovery under
the wrongful death statute is not merely for the wrong done to the dece-
dent, but also for the wrong done to the decedent's beneficiaries.
Most recently in 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court in In re Brantley
v. Brantley considered whether Mississippi law recognized a contingent
wrongful death claim.87 In Brantley, Buffy, the daughter of Billy Butler
and Lee Brantley, suffered a traumatic illness which left her permanently
disabled as a result of alleged medical malpractice.88 Brantley, her mother,
filed a complaint on behalf of Buffy for her personal injuries and reached a
80. Id. at 1069.
81. Id.
82. In re Estate of England, 846 So. 2d at 1069.
83. Estate of Jones v. Howell, 687 So. 2d 1171, 1178 (Miss. 1996) (citing McGowan v. Estate of
Wright, 524 So. 2d 308, 311 (Miss. 1988)); see also 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 109-
10 (Miss. 2003) ("The purposes of the wrongful death statute are to prevent the wrongful termination of
life and provide the beneficiary with compensation for the loss of companionship and society of the
deceased, the pain and suffering of the deceased between injury and death, and punitive damages.").
84. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart, 100 So. 12, 15 (Miss. 1924) (quoting St. Louis
Iron Mt. & S.R.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 650 (1915)).
85. Id. at 14 (quoting St. Louis Iron Mt., 237 U.S. at 650).
86. Id.
87. In re Brantley v. Brantley, 865 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Miss. 2004).
88. Id.
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settlement with Mississippi Baptist Medical Center for $10 million.89 The
settlement agreement purported to release all claims against the hospital
and was to include all claimants and potential claimants. 90 Brantley peti-
tioned the chancery court to appoint her the conservator of Buffy's estate,
and thereafter Brantley filed a petition to settle a doubtful claim. 91 In or-
der to settle the claim, Butler executed a power of attorney which allowed
Brantley to sign a release on his behalf. However, prior to signing these
documents, Butler was not made aware of the settlement details. 92 After
obtaining the power of attorney, Brantley signed a release on behalf of
herself, Butler, Buffy, and the children releasing the defendants.93
Subsequent to signing the release, and apparently upon discovery of
the settlement, Butler filed a complaint on behalf of himself and the chil-
dren asking the chancery court to award the plaintiffs a portion of the set-
tlement "for the past, present and future loss of love, society, companion,
[sic] support and services of Buffy Brantley."94 In essence, Butler sought
on behalf of himself and the children benefits pursuant to the wrongful
death statute despite the fact that Buffy was still alive.95 The trial court
dismissed Butler's complaint on the premise that Mississippi does not rec-
ognize a contingent wrongful death claim.96
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court correctly denied Butler re-
lief because Buffy was still alive. The court unequivocally held, "Missis-
sippi's wrongful death statute ... does not recognize 'contingent' wrongful
death claims."9 7 The Court explained its finding by stating that to find oth-
erwise would usurp Buffy's right to damages merely because her benefi-
ciaries believed she would die sooner than she naturally would have.98 In
so finding, the Court once again reiterated its prior precedent and in-
structed that "[i]mplicit in the codification of the wrongful death action is
the notion that a claim sounding in wrongful death comes into being upon
the death of the deceased." 99 The Brantley court proceeded to explain that
the wrongful death action provides a cause of action to the decedent's sur-
vivors, and one cannot qualify as a survivor until they survive someone. 100
In other words, a beneficiary cannot bring a wrongful death action until a
death occurs. As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court of Mississippi con-
tinued to adhere to the original wrongful death statute of 1857 that states a
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1128-29.
92. Id.
93. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1129.
94. Id.




99. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131 (quoting Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss.
1992)).
100. Id.; see Gentry, 606 So. 2d at 1120 ("A cause of action accrues only when it comes into
existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.").
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wrongful death action does not accrue until the date of the injured person's
death.
In light of the foregoing 149 years of Mississippi Supreme Court prece-
dent holding a wrongful death action accrued on the death of the decedent,
the Court once again addressed the issue of accrual in Jenkins v. Pensacola
Health Trust, Inc.
III. JENKINS V. PENSACOLA HEALTH TRUST, INC.: AN ASSAULT ON
STARE DECISIS
In the Spring of 2006, the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed for
the fourth time the specific issue of when does the statute of limitations
accrue in wrongful death actions, premised upon medical negligence, in
Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc.1"1 The Jenkins court granted an in-
terlocutory appeal to determine "whether the statute of limitations which
has expired on a particular claim of tortious conduct is preempted by the
statute of limitations on bringing a wrongful death suit.""1 2 With only five
members participating, the Court proceeded to disregard 149 years of its
own precedent and formulate a new rule through a brief opinion that did
not so much as reference its numerous contrary decisions.
A. Facts
Mildred Woodson was a resident of the Greenbough Nursing Center
from December 20, 1997 until she passed away on October 4, 2001.1"3
Upon Mrs. Woodson's death, Mary Jenkins, administratrix for the Wood-
son estate, filed a complaint against Pensacola Health Trust, Inc. She al-
leged Mrs. Woodson suffered severe personal injuries which led to her
death while she was a resident of the nursing home. 104 In response, the
defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment and asked the
Court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims which occurred or accrued
before December 31, 1999.1°5 The defendant's argument was premised on
its belief that the statute of limitations for a wrongful death suit did not
revive personal injury claims which would have otherwise been time barred
had the decedent brought them herself.10 6 The trial court agreed with the
defendant and dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims which occurred or ac-
crued before December 31, 1999, as well as, all of the plaintiff's claims
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which she was unable to prove the specific date of occurrence. 1°7 Thereaf-
ter, the plaintiff requested and was granted an interlocutory appeal to an-
swer the question "whether the statute of limitations for wrongful death is
subject to the statute of limitations for the underlying tort."' 0 8
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Mississippi Supreme Court began its discussion by quoting, at
length, from its decision in Gentry v. Wallace.'°9 The Court then stated the
rule adopted in Gentry: the statute of limitations for wrongful death "be-
gins to run on the date of death, regardless of when the statute of limita-
tions began to run for the underlying tort which led to the death."' n Quite
inexplicably, the Court then stated, "[t]he issue was decided differently in
Thiroux v. Austin.""' The Court correctly explained that in Thiroux it de-
veloped the rule that the statute of limitations, for wrongful death pur-
poses, is determined by the appropriate limitations period for the
underlying tort."2
What the Court did not (or perhaps could not) show or explain was
how the issue presented in Jenkins or Gentry was decided differently in
Thiroux. The Court referenced two cases from the United States District
Courts in Mississippi, purportedly as support for a new rule which was
adopted by Thiroux.a1 3 However, neither of the two federal cases cited
employed a rule that the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action
began to run at any time prior to death. Rather, the federal courts merely
cited Thiroux for the rule held therein that a wrongful death action is lim-
ited by the applicable limitations period for the underlying tort."4 After
referencing the two federal district court cases, the Court proceeded to
overrule Gentry and 149 years of its own precedent to the contrary. In so
doing, the Court held "that the statute of limitations on bringing a wrongful
death claim is subject to, and limited by, the statute of limitations associ-
ated with the claims of specific wrongful acts which allegedly led to the
wrongful death.""' 5 In the wake of Jenkins, it was unclear whether the de-
cision was going to be an anomaly, or if the Court was set upon changing its
107. Jenkins, 933 So. 2d at 924-25.
108. Id. at 925.
109. Id. at 925-26.
110. Id. at 926.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Wells v. Radiator Specialty Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 778 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Beck v. Koppers,
Inc., No. 3:04CV160, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26613 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2005).
114. In fac: the defendant in Wells argued, "the three year statute of limitations period of § 15-49-
1 runs from the date of the decedent's death because this action was brought as one for wrongful
death." Wells, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 781. Moreover, the Beck court denied a summary judgment motion
based on a three year statute of limitation where the victim died five years before the filing of the action
and six years after being diagnosed with breast cancer. The Beck court adopted the view that the
statute of limitations, for wrongful death, does not begin to run until the discovery of both the death
and its cause. Beck, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26613 at *2-4.
115. Jenkins, 933 So. 2d at 926.
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application of the wrongful death statute. Furthermore, the Jenkins deci-
sion left judges, attorneys, scholars, and students scratching their heads as
to how and why the state's highest court would disregard its very own over-
whelming precedent to the contrary, as well as three cases specifically on
point which reached conclusions directly opposite to that reached of
Jenkins.
116
IV. BAD LAW MAKES WORSE PRECEDENT
Many are familiar with the oft-used adage "tough facts make bad law;"
a corollary to that should be bad law makes worse precedent. Just four
months after the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins, the
Court handed down its decision in Cleveland v. Mann, wherein the Court
continued upon its unfounded reinterpretation of Mississippi's wrongful
death statute.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Cleveland v. Mann, John Mann underwent surgery for stomach can-
cer at the Central Mississippi Medical Center."a7 Prior to his surgery,
Mann's physician, Dr. Kenneth Cleveland, presented Mann with a physi-
cian-patient arbitration agreement, which he signed nineteen days before
undergoing surgery.1 8 Sadly, after his third surgery, Mann died on August
27, 2003."9 Thereafter, John and Mark Mann, the wrongful death benefi-
ciaries, filed a complaint against Dr. Cleveland and others wherein they
alleged Mann died as a result of medical malpractice. 2 ° In response, the
defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, and in support of their
motion, the defendants pointed to language in the arbitration agreement
which purported to bind Mann's "heirs-at-law or personal representa-
tives.'' 112 After denying the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, the
defendants appealed and the Mississippi Supreme Court considered




The Cleveland court relied upon two cases which did not involve
wrongful death claims but did bind heirs to arbitration agreements signed
by the decedents and held the arbitration agreement bound the wrongful
116. Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1994); Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117 (Miss.
1992); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1967).





122. Id. at 112.
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death beneficiaries of Mann.1 3 The Court then elaborated on three points
in which the majority disagreed with the dissent's opinion.
First, the majority objected to the dissent's premise that a "wrongful
death action belongs solely to the heirs of the deceased.' '124 In response to
the dissent's statement, the majority pointed to the language in the statute
which states the plaintiff in a wrongful death action must pursue "all the
damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages to every kind to
any and all parties interested in the suit."'1 25 The Court proceeded to point
out the parties interested in the suit may include "the estate of the dece-
dent, an insurance company exercising its right of subrogation, and any
other parties claiming a right of recovery.' 1 26 While the majority was cor-
rect in its assertion that the plaintiff in a wrongful death action must pursue
the damages of all interested parties, the dissent's statement that the
wrongful death action belongs to the heirs of the deceased was and is cor-
rect.' 27 The majority confused the dissent's premise to whom the cause of
action belongs with who is entitled to recover under the statute. Moreover,
as the Mississippi Supreme Court recently pointed out in In re Brantley v.
Brantley, a person who is injured but not yet deceased may not bring a
contingent wrongful death action, because "[o]ur wrongful death statute
provides a cause of actions [sic] to the survivors of those who die as a result
of wrongful conduct.'
28
Second, the majority contested the dissent's assertion that a "wrongful
death is different from other torts because it cannot arise until after
death."' 29 In an attempt to refute the dissent's position, the majority
merely pointed out that a wrongful death action is not a tort, but a cause of
action based on an underlying tort which causes the decedent's death.13 °
While the majority is correct that a wrongful death action is not a tort but
rather a cause of action, the majority missed the entire crux of the dissent's
argument. The Supreme Court of Mississippi had unequivocally held for
over one hundred years that a wrongful death cause of action is a new
action that accrues in favor of the statutory beneficiaries upon the dece-
dent's death.13' The essence of the dissent's argument is that a wrongful
123. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 112. See Terminix Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 2004)
(wife bound by arbitration agreement signed by deceased husband for termite services); Smith Barney,
Inc. v. Henry, 775 So. 2d 722 (Miss. 2001) (arbitration agreement bound suit for breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and conspiracy).
124. Cleveland, 947 So. 2d at 118.
125. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972).
126. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 118.
127. See Miss. CODE AN. § 11-7-13 (1972) (wherein the statute lists the order of persons who
may bring a suit for wrongful death no where in the statute is an insurance company entitled to bring a
wrongful death action on its own accord).
128. In re Brantley v. Brantley, 865 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Gentry v. Wallace, 606
So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss. 1992)) (emphasis in the original).
129. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 118.
130. Id.
131. E.g., In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131; McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So. 2d 652, 654 (Miss. 1996);
Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 335 (Miss. 1994); Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss.
1992); Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646, 650 (Miss. 1979); Byars v. Austin, 218 So. 2d 11, 15
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death action does not arise until after death, and as such, a living person
does not have the right, ability, or standing to agree to arbitrate that which
he or she does not have.
132
Finally, the majority attempted to interpret the language of the wrong-
ful death statute in such a way that would mandate the wrongful death
beneficiaries arbitrate their claim. The Court quoted the following from
the wrongful death statute:
Whenever the death of any person .. .shall be caused by
any real, wrongful or negligent act or omission,.., as would,
if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or
damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover dam-
ages in respect thereof, . . . the person ... that would have
been liable if death had not ensued, . . .shall be liable for
damages.
133
The Court interpreted the language to mean that a wrongful death
beneficiary can only bring claims which the decedent could have brought in
the event the decedent survived.134 From that premise, the majority in-
structed that the converse was also true, and descendants could not bring
claims which the decedent could not have brought in the event he or she
survived.1 35 In support of its proposition, the majority cited its recent deci-
sion in Jenkins and made clear the fact that Jenkins was not to be an anom-
aly, but rather a new direction that this Court will take toward limiting
wrongful death beneficiaries' rights. The Court thereafter held, "[b]ecause
Mann agreed to arbitrate, he could not have brought this claim for medical
malpractice even if death had not ensued .... Therefore, since Mann could
not have brought this claim, neither can [the] plaintiffs.
'1 36
The underlying problem with the Court's opinion in Cleveland is its
observation that the statutory beneficiaries cannot bring claims which the
decedent could not have brought had he or she survived. However, as
pointed out by the same Court in Brantley, a victim of a personal injury
which may result in death cannot bring a contingent wrongful death
claim."'37 Likewise, the Court previously explained in Partyka that a person
cannot circumvent the wrongful death statute through his will because a
(Miss. 1969); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91, 93(Miss. 1967); Hawkins v. Rye, 101 So.
2d 516, 521 (Miss. 1958); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 17 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1944); Mississippi
Power Co. v. Archibald, 196 So. 760, 762 (Miss. 1940); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart,
100 So. 12,14 (Miss. 1924); Pickens v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 45 So. 868 (Miss. 1908); Foster v. Yazoo &
M.V.R. Co., 18 So. 380, 381 (Miss. 1895); see also In re Estate of England, 846 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Miss.
App. 2003).
132. See Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646, 650 (Miss. 1979) (living person cannot
circumvent wrongful death statute's distribution provision through his or her will).
133. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972).
134. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 118.
135. Id. at 119.
136. Id. at 119.
137. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1130.
[VOL. 27:235
"I'M NOT DEAD YET!"
person cannot bequeath what he does not have.13 8 Thus, since the wrong-
ful death statute creates a new cause of action in favor of the named benefi-
ciaries, "[t]he cause of action thereby created is not a part of the estate of
the deceased (intestate). ' 139 Taking the majority's rule to its fullest extent,
since the decedent cannot bring contingent wrongful death claims during
his lifetime, a wrongful death beneficiary could never bring a wrongful
death claim.
Furthermore, the Mississippi Constitution declares that "[a]ll courts
shall be open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay."14 By re-
quiring the wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death
action, the Cleveland court has denied the beneficiaries their constitutional
right to open courts. The Mississippi Supreme Court has unequivocally
held that the wrongful death action is a new cause of action which accrues
at death in favor of the named statutory beneficiaries.141 Moreover, the
Court has recognized that an injured person, prior to their death, has no
interest or ability to assert a wrongful death claim. 42 Therefore, it is quite
preposterous to bind the wrongful death beneficiaries to an arbitration
agreement which they have never seen nor signed. Furthermore, it is poor
public policy to allow a person's constitutional right to open and accessible
courts to be easily waived by individuals with no right to assert the claim
which they are agreeing to arbitrate. The Court's decision in Cleveland
cited Jenkins as its sole support for the new direction the present court is
taking toward limiting the statutory rights of wrongful death, and in so do-
ing has further frustrated those beneficiaries' statutory rights.
V. FROM BAD PRECEDENT TO WORSE LAW
Most recently, the Mississippi Court of Appeals has further befuddled
the application of the statute of limitations in wrongful death actions in
May v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment, Corp. 43 In May, the court of appeals
was faced with an appeal from the circuit court's grant of summary judg-
ment, finding plaintiff's claims for wrongful death to be time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.1 44 The court of appeals in May addressed
the question "when does a claim for wrongful death accrue? '145 While
looking to the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins for gui-
dance, the court of appeals held, "[t]he wrongful death claim accrues when
138. Partyka, 376 So. 2d at 650.
139. Id.
140. Miss. CONST. of 1890 art. 3, § 24.
141. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131; McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So. 2d 652, 654 (Miss. 1996);
Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 335 (Miss. 1994).
142. Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1132.
143. May v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp., 948 So. 2d 403 (Miss. App. 2007).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 485.
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the claim for the underlying wrongful conduct accrues. '  In so stating,
the court of appeals drove the final nail in the coffin, expanded the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins, and continued to disregard over
one-hundred years of Mississippi Supreme Court precedent to the
contrary.147
The court of appeals overlooked the fact that the Jenkins decision did
not state that a wrongful death action accrued when the claim for the un-
derlying tort accrued. Rather, the Jenkins decision merely held "a wrong-
ful death claim is subject to, and limited by, the statue of limitations
associated with the claims of specific wrongful acts which allegedly led to
the wrongful death." '48 However, in a response to the special concurrence
written by Judge Chandler, the majority opined that the precise thing the
Supreme Court of Mississippi did when it overruled Gentry was to alter the
rule that a wrongful death action accrues prior to the death of the injured
person.14 9
In a special concurrence joined by four other judges, Judge Chandler
agreed that in the wake of Jenkins the plaintiff's claims were time barred
but wrote separately to address language in the majority opinion which was
"imprecise and potentially confusing."15 ° Specifically, Judge Chandler dis-
agreed with the majority's proposition that the Mississippi Supreme
Court's decision in Jenkins stood for the point that "the wrongful death
claim accrues when the claim for the underlying wrongful conduct ac-
crues."15' Judge Chandler quoted the relevant portions of the Jenkins
opinion referenced by the majority in order to illustrate the absence of any
language by the Supreme Court that purportedly changed the time at
which a wrongful death claim accrues.152
The concurrence shed light on the numerous problems and issues
which may result in light of the majority's opinion. The concurrence
pointed out that "a cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as
an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.' '1 53
146. Id. at 486.
147. E.g., In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131; McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So. 2d 652, 654 (Miss. 1996);
Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 335 (Miss. 1994); Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Miss.
1992); Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646, 650 (Miss. 1979); Byars v. Austin, 218 So. 2d 11, 15
(Miss. 1969); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91, 93(Miss. 1967); Hawkins v. Rye, 101 So.
2d 516, 521 (Miss. 1958); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 17 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1944); Mississippi
Power Co. v. Archibald, 196 So. 760, 762 (Miss. 1940); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart,
100 So. 12, 14 (Miss. 1924); Pickens v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 45 So. 868 (Miss. 1908); Foster v. Yazoo &
M.V.R. Co., 18 So. 380, 381 (Miss. 1895); see also In re Estate of England, 846 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Miss.
App. 2003).
148. Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 2006).
149. May, 948 So. 2d at 486.
150. Id. (Chandler, J., concurring). Judge Chandler's concurrence was joined by Chief Judge King,
and Judges Lee, Myers and Irving.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1121 (Miss. 1992)); see Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990); see also Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 14 So. 2d
344, 346 Miss. 1943) ("Citation from neither judicial decision nor lexicon is needed to support the view
[VOL. 27:235
"I'M NOT DEAD YET!"
Thus, under the majority's conclusion that a claim for wrongful death ac-
crues when the claim for the underlying conduct accrues, a claim for
wrongful death would "vest" upon the occurrence of the wrongful conduct,
and accordingly, a person who had not yet died would be entitled to bring a
claim for wrongful death. However, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ex-
pressly rejected that proposition in Brantley, wherein the Court held the
wrongful death statute does not recognize "contingent wrongful death
claims."' 54
The May opinion is illustrative of the shaky ground on which the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court based its Jenkins decision. If the court of appeals
decision in May stands, it will necessarily call into question numerous deci-
sions over the last one-hundred years which relied on the holding that a
wrongful death accrued upon the injured person's death. If the current law
remains that a wrongful death action vests at the same time the underlying
wrongful conduct accrued, then victims will necessarily have to be able to
plead contingent wrongful death claims in the event the wrongful conduct
causes their premature death. Furthermore, if a living victim has a cause of
action that has vested the rationale prohibiting them from assigning their
claims prior to their death through testamentary acts will no longer remain
valid.' 55 Through its unnecessary and ill-conceived tinkering with the
wrongful death statute, the Mississippi Supreme Court has called into ques-
tion all of its decisions of the last 149 years which relied on the holding that
a wrongful death action accrues at the time of death.
VI. A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
The recent abrupt change in the Court's wrongful death jurisprudence
came as a surprise to many practitioners throughout Mississippi. In fact,
the Court's brief opinion in Jenkins overruled an overwhelming amount of
precedent to the contrary. However, the most troubling aspect of the
Court's opinion is its inability to be reconciled with the plain language of
the wrongful death statute and the history of the statute. Furthermore, the
Court's opinion failed to recognize, address, and give stare decisis effect to
the overwhelming contrary supreme court precedent that undoubtedly
leaves members of both the bench and bar questioning the precedential
value of the Court's prior opinions.
that a cause of action 'accrues' when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the
right to sue becomes vested.").
154. In re Brantley v. Brantley, 865 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Miss. 2004).
155. See In re England v. England, 846 So. 2d 1060, 1070 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); see also Partyka v.
Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646, 647 (Miss. 1979) (where the supreme court rejected an attempt to
bypass the mandatory distribution provisions found in the wrongful death statute on the ground the
wrongful death statute creates a new action in favor of the beneficiaries and one cannot bequeath or
devise what they do not have).
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A. The Plain Language of the Statute Mandates a Different Answer
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous it is inappropriate for the
court to add or take away anything from the statute.156 In fact, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has long cautioned that adding or subtracting from
such a statute would be a judicial encroachment upon the inherent and
exclusive power of the legislature.'57 The Mississippi wrongful death stat-
ute is codified in section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code and is titled
"[a]ctions for injuries producing death." The language and consequently
the title of the statute is profoundly clear and unambiguous; therefore, the
Court must give heed to the legislature's declarations.
The opening clause of the wrongful death statute states, "[w]henever
the death of any person or of any unborn quick child.' 1 58 Therefore, a
plain reading of the wrongful death statute provides that an action may be
brought under section 11-7-13 only after death. The anomalous result
reached in the Court's decision in Jenkins pays no heed to the clear intent
of the legislature. Rather, Jenkins has muddied the water to the extent that
the time for filing a wrongful death action may abate, before the claim
comes into existence, a result that is profoundly absurd, and possibly
unconstitutional.
The wrongful death statute contains within it a paragraph which states
the damages which are recoverable in an action for wrongful death. Listed
among the damages recoverable, the Mississippi Legislature expressly in-
cluded, "funeral, medical or other related expenses." '159 Once again, the
Jenkins court failed to heed the express language of the statute in its at-
tempt to rewrite the wrongful death statute from the bench. One can only
wonder how a person could recover funeral expenses when they are still
alive and have yet to incur these expenses.
Moreover, the final paragraph of the wrongful death statute, which
provides for the manner of distribution for any wrongful death recovery
begins, "[d]amages for the injury and death."'6 ° By separately accounting
for the distribution of the resultant damages for both the injury and death,
it is clear from the plain language that the legislature enacted section 11-7-
13 as a new and separate cause of action. This new action, by the plain
language of the statute, comes into existence only upon the death of the
injured person. That much can be determined giving the statute its plain
and ordinary meaning. The resounding theme of the wrongful death stat-
ute is its dependency upon an injury which wrongfully causes a person's
156. Bayer Corp. v. Reed, 932 So. 2d 786, 789 (Miss. 2006).
157. Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co., 56 So. 466, 490 (Miss. 1911); see also id. ("Whenever
the judiciary shall undertake to violate these rules-indeed, we may say maxims-then it is guilty of
usurpation in its most obnoxious form; and the courts dare not do this lest they destroy their own
usefulness and power.").
158. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972) (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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premature death to come into existence.16' The wrongful death statute is
clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, there is no need to resort to canons
of statutory construction. 62 However, even if the court was not certain by
a plain reading of the statute the effect to give the statute, a resort to the
history of the statute would have cleared any uncertainties.
B. History Demands a Different Conclusion: Canons of
Statutory Construction
Justice Dickinson, in his majority decisions penned in Jenkins and
Cleveland, chose to hang his hat on the following language contained in
section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code:
Whenever the death of any person ... shall be caused by
any real, wrongful or negligent act or omission,... as would,
if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured or
damaged thereby to maintain an action and recover dam-
ages in respect thereof,... the person ... that would have
been liable if death had not ensued, .... shall be liable for
damages.
63
By selectively quoting portions of the wrongful death statute, Justice
Dickinson was able to find support for his holding that beneficiaries could
not bring a wrongful death action where the statute of limitations would
have prevented a claim for the underlying injury.' 6 4 However, Justice
Dickinson's explanation ignores the first six words of the statute which
read "[w]henever the death of any person."' 65 It is understood that a stat-
ute of limitation cannot abate a cause of action before it comes into exis-
tence, yet that is precisely what the court's decision in Jenkins did. A plain
reading of the wrongful death statute demonstrates that it vests and hence
accrues only upon the death of a person. As such, the Court should have
given the statute its plain and ordinary meaning.
However, had the Court deemed it necessary to delve into the canons
of statutory construction, "one of the cardinal rules of construction is to
ascertain the conditions of affairs at the time of its enactment, the evil to be
avoided, and the necessary effect produced by the statute."' 66 Therefore,
the proper place to look to interpret the wrongful death statute is the his-
tory from whence it came.
The Mississippi wrongful death statute was a legislative effort to fix the
common law result which made a person liable for inflicting a scratch on a
161. In fact, the word "death" can be found in the wrongful death statute twenty-seven times,
while the word "deceased" may be found in the statute fifteen times.
162. Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Miss. 1979).
163. Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 118 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13
(1972)) (emphasis in original).
164. Id.
165. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972) (emphasis added).
166. Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co., 56 So. 466, 490 (Miss. 1911).
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victim but imposed no liability to the person who inflicted death upon a
victim. The Mississippi Legislature enacted the first such statute in 1857.167
Interestingly, the initial wrongful death statute contained the familiar lan-
guage relied on so heavily by Justice Dickinson that entitled a person to
bring an action where he or she would be so entitled is death had not en-
sued. 168 However, quite contrary to the holding reached by Justice Dickin-
son and the majority, the original wrongful death statute contained its own
limitations provision which expressly stated the action must be brought
within one year of the death of the deceased individual.169 Furthermore,
the specific language relied upon by Justice Dickinson and the majority has
persisted in every amendment to the wrongful death statute since its origi-
nal passage in 1857 to the present date. Coincidentally, the one year limita-
tions provision persisted in the statute from its original enactment in 1857
until the legislature removed the limitations provision in 1906.170 Thus for
first fifty years after the codification of the wrongful death statute, the re-
sult reached by the majority in Jenkins was simply impossible.
At the time of the passage of the first wrongful death statute, the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature was the anomalous result of the
common law, wherein a person who injured but did not kill a person was
more culpable than the person whose injury resulted in death. To combat
that evil the Mississippi Legislature enacted its first wrongful death statute
which allowed the named statutory beneficiaries to commence an action for
the damages caused to both the decedent, as well as, the beneficiaries. At
the same time, the legislature sought to preserve certain defenses available
to a defendant to a wrongful death action by limiting recovery against de-
fendants who would have been "liable for damages if death had not
ensued.'
171
However, because the legislature's original enactment expressly de-
clared a one year limitation period beginning from the date of the dece-
dent's death, it is clear the language relied upon by Justice Dickinson was
not meant to time bar actions. Rather, as Dean Prosser explains, the lan-
guage originally found in Lord Campbell's Act "intended at least to pre-
vent recovery for death where the decedent could never at any time have
maintained an action, as, for example, where there was simply no tortious
conduct toward him."'1 72 Dean Prosser went on to explain the general
agreement that the language can be employed to deny recovery on the
grounds of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, valid consent to the
defendant's conduct, fellow-servant rule, self-defense, or defense of prop-
erty.173 In fact Dean Prosser, in speaking on the defense of the statute of
167. Miss. CODE ch. 61, art. 48 (1857).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Miss. CODE § 676 (1871); Miss. CODE § 1510 (1880); Miss. CODE ANN. § 663 (1892); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 721 (1906).
171. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972).
172. PROSSER & KEETON, supra n.22, § 127, at 954.
173. Id. at 954-55.
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limitations, explained the vast majority of courts have held the statute runs
only upon the death of the victim, and only a few courts have held the
limitations statute begins to run from the time of injury and consequently
may be time barred before ever accruing.174
The legislative redrafting of the wrongful death statute undertaken by
the Mississippi Supreme Court goes against not only the plain meaning of
the statute, but it is also contrary to the history and purpose behind enact-
ment of the statute. The legislature enacted the wrongful death statute in
1857 in an effort to end the harsh common law rule which left those most
harmed by wrongdoers without any remedy or relief. For 149 years the
statute, while undergoing some minor changes, was effectively unchanged
and contained much of its original language.
However, the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion in Jenkins changed
the once stable landscape of its wrongful death jurisprudence and turned
the clock back in Mississippi to the harsh common law rule in some cases.
In effect, Jenkins has left the people of Mississippi with three classes of
victims. The first are those who suffered an injury, but their injury does not
result in death. These people are able to recover for the injuries they sus-
tained as they have been throughout common law history. Second, are
those victims who suffered an injury and subsequently die within the one,
two, or three year statute of limitations period. The beneficiaries of this
second group, due to the kindness and thoughtfulness of the victim to die
quickly enough, are able to recover under the wrongful death statute for
the full extent of their own and the decedent's damages. The final group
are the unfortunates. These are the beneficiaries of a person who was in-
jured but did not die within the applicable one, two, or three year limita-
tions period. Because of the failure of the decedent to die promptly, the
beneficiaries in the third group are unable to recover the full extent of
damages done to both themselves as well as the decedent.
Thus, the Jenkins, opinion has effectively frustrated the intent of the
legislature and has provided safe harbor to a specific class of tortfeasors.
Specifically, tortfeasors whose actions, omissions, or products cause slow
deaths, comas, or other periods of agony, pain, suffering, and delay prior to
death will be able to escape liability entirely. Simply put, the supposed
"fix" the majority engineered in Jenkins will do nothing to ensure manufac-
turers, physicians, drivers, or any other potential tortfeasors act in a safe
and responsible manner. Rather, the result of Jenkins offers potential
tortfeasors incentives to make sure that if their actions do cause someone
to die, to make sure the death happens slowly, so that the only legal means
the decedent's beneficiaries have to hold the tortfeasor accountable will be
time-barred.
174. Id. at 956.
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C. A Complete Disregard to Stare Decisis
In an appendix to the decision in Long v. McKinney,175 Justice Dickin-
son set out to provide a brief history on the wrongful death statute in Mis-
sissippi. In his opinion, Justice Dickinson traced the wrongful death statute
back to Lord Ellenborough's decision in Baker v. Bolton, wherein Lord
Ellenborough held the death of a human being was not an injury compen-
sable at law. 176 In so holding, many historians accused Lord Ellenborough
of "turning deaf ears and blind eyes to English history."'1 77 In essence,
Lord Ellenborough wrongly decided Baker because of his failure to pay
heed and respect to the English common law at the time of Baker, in other
words, his failure to give stare decisis effect to the prior law. 178 Sadly, and
even more disappointing because of its acknowledgement of Lord Ellen-
borough's failure, the Mississippi Supreme Court has also chosen to turn a
deaf ear and a blind eye to Mississippi history and precedent in its decision
in Jenkins.
The judicial principle of stare decisis is not a principle unknown to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi. In fact, in the 1991 decision of State ex rel.
Moore v. Molpus, the Court discussed at length the principle of stare deci-
sis when asked to overturn a prior decision of the Court, and at the same
time seventy years of precedent to the contrary. 179 The Court began its
discussion of stare decisis and cautioned "that long established legal inter-
pretations ought not lightly be disturbed."'8 ° Stare decisis draws its power
from the idea that "when a majority of the Court speaks, it speaks as the
voice of the State, and is binding in effect until and unless overruled."''
Thus, the proper question for the Court to ask is: when is the doctrine
of stare decisis not offended by overruling a prior decision? In other
words, when is it appropriate for the Court to overrule a prior decision? In
answering that question, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has long since
held that mere error is insufficient grounds to overrule a prior decision.'82
In addition to error in its previous decision, a party asking the Court to
overrule its prior precedent must show the decision to be "pernicious," '183
"impractical,"' 84 or "mischievous in its effect, and resulting in detriment to
175. Long v. McKinney, 897 So. 2d 160, 162-169 (Miss. 2004).
176. Id. at 179.
177. Id.
178. In fact, Dean Prosser described Lord Ellenborough as "not the English judge most distin-
guished by a reputation for common sense." WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS, 1088 (5th ed. 1971).
179. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1991).
180. Id. at 634.
181. Childress v. State, 195 So. 583, 584 (Miss. 1940).
182. Id.
183. Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So. 2d 184, 190 (Miss. 1949).
184. Robinson v. State, 434 So. 2d 206, 210 (Miss. 1983) (Hawkins, J., concurring).
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the public." '185 The Court looks for error in its prior decision, but in addi-
tion it looks for "public or widespread disadvantage"' 86 or "evils attendant
upon a continuation of the old rule."' 87
Applying the proper review standard in Jenkins, the Court should not
have just looked for error or disagreement with its prior decision in Gentry.
Rather, the Court should have taken an additional step and looked for
something more, something pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in ef-
fect which resulted in detriment to the public. Instead, the Court in one
sentence simply stated, "[r]ecognizing that, in Thiroux, we should have spe-
cifically overruled Gentry, we do so now." '188 What the Court did not an-
swer in Jenkins or Thiroux was why should they have overruled Gentry?
Applying the rule that the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions
accrues at death was not impractical, pernicious, and surely it did not pro-
duce an effect which resulted in a detriment to the public. In fact, the rule
was quite the opposite; it was an easy to apply black letter rule which had
persisted for 149 years.
Stare decisis has a counterpart, which was likewise offended by the
Jenkins decision, that is, the people of this state "have a need to have their
law settled so that they might rely upon it."' 89 Prior to Jenkins, the people
of Mississippi had a rule of law whose origins could be traced back 149
years to the original enactment of the wrongful death statute. In interpret-
ing this rule, the Supreme Court of Mississippi decided numerous cases
that call the validity of the Jenkins decision into question. On the other
hand, one can ask, what have the people of Mississippi gained by the new
rule adopted by the Court? It is obvious now, and it will undoubtedly be-
come even more evident, that the Jenkins decision will not clarify a hotly
disputed question of statutory interpretation. Rather, ancillary litigation
will undoubtedly arise in new cases in which the precise date on which the
limitations period began to run is uncertain and contested, whereas previ-
ously the answer was clear, the limitations period began on the date the
victim died. This new rule will create unnecessary ancillary litigation that
will delay court proceedings without addressing the merits of the claim. In
fact, contrary to Jenkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi had previously
held on three separate occasions the exact opposite; however, the Jenkins
opinion only specifically overrules one of them. 9 ' The Jenkins decision has
left the people of Mississippi in the precarious position of wondering how
185. Childress, 195 So. at 584.
186. State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 635 (Miss. 1991).
187. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 467 (Miss. 1983).
188. Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss 2006). The Jenkins opinion
is eerily similar to Lord Ellenborough's reported opinion in Baker v. Bolton in that both opinions were,
"very brief, and the controversial rule of law was laid down without either sustaining reasoning or
supporting authority." T.A. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAN. L.
REv. 605, 614-15 (1960).
189. Moore, 578 So. 2d at 637.
190. See Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1994); Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117
(Miss. 1992); Smith v. McComb Infirmary Ass'n, 196 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1967).
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they can mold their behavior in accordance with the law of the state when
the highest court of the state has shown little deference to its own opinions.
One of the most troubling aspects of the Jenkins decision is that the
result cannot even be reconciled with prior decisions of the same Justices.
Just two years prior to Jenkins, Justices Waller, Dickinson, Carlson, and
Chief Justice Smith all joined in an opinion authored by Justice Carlson
wherein they quoted Gentry as holding, "[i]mplicit in the codification of
[the] wrongful death action is the notion that a claim sounding in wrongful
death comes into being upon the death of the deceased."' 91 Only through
a complete disregard to the judicial principle of stare decisis can the opin-
ion of Justices Waller, Dickinson, Carlson, and Chief Justice Smith in
Brantley be reconciled with their own decision just two years later that the
statute of limitations for wrongful death actions is determined by the date
of the underlying tort. One can only ponder how a Supreme Court Justice
can find something to be "implicit" and then a mere two years later hold
the precise opposite. This leaves one to wonder not what stare decisis ef-
fect is given by the Mississippi Supreme Court to its prior precedent, but
rather, does the Curt continue to adhere to stare decisis at all when the
Justices will not even give their own decision's precedential effect?
At one time the Supreme Court of Mississippi explained that the prin-
ciple of stare decisis was of primary importance because stare decisis fos-
ters respect for the law in "that people cling to the idea that their cases
should be decided the same no matter who the judge may be." '192 This is
especially true in a state which has an elected judiciary. The people of
Mississippi are left with no concept as to what the law truly is if each newly
elected judge embarks upon a crusade to overrule or reverse the decisions
of his or her predecessor. More importantly, legal thought will stagnate if
newly elected judges merely embark to revisit and reverse the court's nu-
merous prior decisions in an attempt to overtly politicize the Court.
The Court made another observation which is relevant in wake of the
Jenkins opinion, "[p]rincipled consistency and respect for precedent pro-
mote acceptance. They reflect a consensus about law. They contribute to
the notion that law binds judges as well as litigants, and not just when we
agree. Good judges know this and will change legal interpretations only
for the most persuasive reasons."' 93 The people of Mississippi need and
deserve to know that the Supreme Court Justices they have elected are
bound to follow the law just as every citizen and visitor to Mississippi. Fur-
thermore, the government of Mississippi has established an appropriate
outlet for the changing and amending of laws and that forum is the legisla-
ture, not the courts. The law of Mississippi concerning when an action for
wrongful death accrues had been settled for almost 150 years. All that,
191. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131 (quoting Gentry, 606 So. 2d at 1120).
192. Moore, 578 So. 2d at 638.
193. Id. at 638-39.
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however, is now lost. Most troubling, the Jenkins decision leaves the peo-
ple of Mississippi with no confidence that their Supreme Court will adhere
to, or even respect, its own precedent.
D. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that no person
shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' 9 4 The United States Supreme Court has affirmatively held "that a
cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."' 95 The Court has instructed that be-
cause a cause of action is a species of property, "the Due Process Clause
grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its
merits fairly judged."' 96 The Court in Logan v. Zimmerman went on to put
it as plain as possible and cautioned other states that "[a] State may not,
finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an
opportunity to present his claim of entitlement."' 97 In addition, the Logan
Court advised that states, consistent with Due Process, may enact statutes
of limitation; a98 however, the Fourteenth Amendment requires "an oppor-
tunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner ... for
[a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."' 9 9
In light of the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent, the
Jenkins decision raises very serious constitutional concerns. Notably, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has routinely held the wrongful death statute
creates a new cause of action in favor of the statutorily named benefi-
ciaries. 20 0 By enacting the Mississippi wrongful death statute in 1857, the
people of Mississippi, through the legislature, created a cause of action to
benefit the beneficiaries of individuals whose lives had been cut short
through the wrongful acts or omissions of others. The wrongful death
cause of action was not a cause of action which could be asserted by an
injured person who merely anticipated his life may or may not be prema-
turely cut short.20 ' Rather, the wrongful death act allowed the benefi-
ciaries to be compensated for the double wrong committed by a tortfeasor,
both against the decedent and the beneficiaries. 2  Therefore, pursuant to
United States Supreme Court precedent, the statutory wrongful death ben-
eficiaries have a cause of action which is protected by the Fourteenth
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
195. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
196. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433.
197. Id.
198. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314-16 (1945).
199. Logan, 455 U.S. at 437 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
200. In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1131; Gentry, 606 So. 2d at 1120; Partyka, 376 So. 2d at 650;
Hasson Grocery Co., 17 So. 2d at 791.
201. See In re Brantley, 865 So. 2d at 1127.
202. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart, 100 So. 2d 12, 14 (Miss. 1924).
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Amendment; accordingly, states must afford those beneficiaries due
process.
20 3
The Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held a cause of action
does not accrue until it vests or comes into existence as an enforceable
claim.2°4 Furthermore, if a suit is commenced before the accrual of a cause
of action, the Court must, on appropriate objection, dismiss the cause.20 5
In fact, the Forman court found the idea that a cause of action accrues
when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim to be so engrained in
judicial teachings that "[c]itation to neither judicial decision nor lexicon is
needed to support the view. '2 6 Because the Mississippi Supreme Court
continues to adhere to the view that a cause of action must accrue before a
person may commence the action, the decision reached in Jenkins will
never be able to comport with fundamental ideals of due process.
In the wake of Jenkins, there undoubtedly will be instances in which a
victim has been wrongfully injured yet does not die within the one, two, or
three-year limitations period. The beneficiaries of this group of individuals
will never be able to receive the compensation to which the Legislature has
deemed them entitled, because they are not allowed an opportunity to be
heard. While on the other hand, beneficiaries of individuals who were
wrongfully injured who subsequently died within the one, two, or three
year limitations period will have the opportunity to receive full compensa-
tion under the law. What is most obnoxious to the current state of law is
the inequitable and unconstitutional result was not the product of poorly
drafted legislation, but rather the result of judicial activism2 7 by the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi.
The days of Baker v. Bolton have resurfaced in modern Mississippi.
The Legislature in 1857 gave the people of this state a cause of action in
favor of certain statutory beneficiaries when another person's wrongful acts
or omissions proximately caused the wronged person to die. For almost
150 years the Supreme Court of Mississippi supported the rights given by
the legislature to the people of Mississippi. In the course of the past 150
years, a body of wrongful death jurisprudence has slowly and carefully
203. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) ("Arguably, the cause of action for
wrongful death that the State has created is a species of 'property' protected by the Due Process
Clause.").
204. McMillan v. Puckett, 678 So. 2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1996); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers
Corp., 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1943).
205. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990); Eudlid-Miss. v. Western
Cas. & Sur. Co., 163 So. 2d 676 (Miss. 1964).
206. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1943).
207. Professor Arthur Hellman points out in his writings that there is no widely accepted label for
a judge, or a court, which is predisposed to overrule its own precedent. Professor Hellman explained
that a court with a predisposition to overrule its own precedent differs from a court which routinely
strikes down legislative acts as unconstitutional and accordingly should be given a different label. Pro-
fessor Hellman posits that a court, which finds legislative acts to be unconstitutional, is engaged in
judicial activism while a court, which routinely overrules its own precedent, is engaged in judicial radi-
catism. However, for the purposes of this article the author uses the more common phrase of judicial
activism. See Arthur D. Hellman, Judicial Activism: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 21 Miss. C. L.
REV. 253, 257 (2002).
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evolved in this state according to the underlying principle that a wrongful
death action accrued upon the person's death. However, now an activist
court has carved out a niche in its wrongful death jurisprudence for a spe-
cific group of wrongful death beneficiaries. For the beneficiaries of victims
who do not die within the applicable one, two, or three-year limitations
period, the Supreme Court has effectively recognized that they have a
cause of action, but the Court is now refusing to give them an ability to
assert their claim and an opportunity to be heard. In some instances, the
Court, post-Jenkins, is stating that a beneficiary's right to sue for wrongful
death is time barred even before coming into existence.2"8
The post-Jenkins rule adopted by the Court is the epitome of judicial
denial of due process rights, rights the Legislature has given the people, yet
the Court is now refusing to enforce. In so doing, a specific group of Mis-
sissippians have been cast aside by their Supreme Court and are being told
they have a right, yet they can never enforce that right.20 9 A popular rea-
son why the British Parliament adopted the Lord Campbell's Act in 1846
was that as a result of Lord Ellenborough's folly, it became more costly for
a tortfeasor to scratch a man than to kill him. In addition to setting poor
public policy, it made little sense that a person should escape all liability for
imposing the most harm possible upon a person. However, in the wake of
Jenkins, the rule in Mississippi has made it more costly to kill a man in-
stantly than to kill him slowly as a result of repeated exposure to negligent
acts, harmful products, or a lingering coma.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Mississippi's decision in Jenkins v. Pensacola
Health Trust Inc., has effectively turned the clock back for some wrongful
death beneficiaries in Mississippi to the harsh rule that developed following
Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Baker v. Bolton. If Jenkins is allowed to
stand, a specific group of wrongful death beneficiaries will be left without a
means to enforce the remedy which the Legislature has provided for them.
Fortunately, however, all is not lost. Subsequent to Lord Ellenbor-
ough's poorly reasoned decision, the British Parliament remedied the harsh
rule that developed through the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act. The
founders of this nation and this state wisely established three separate but
equal branches of government and bestowed upon each branch distinct
208. Another anomalous result of the rule articulate in Jenkins is victims who are injured and who
may succumb to their injuries after a prolonged period are forced to commence their suit before they
know the full extent of their damages. Furthermore, in light of the court's decision in Brantley the
injured person who believes their injuries may result in a premature death is barred from asserting a
contingent wrongful death claim.
209. "The argument for allowing the claim is that the wrongful death action creates a new cause of
action in favor of the survivors, and that the survivors or their representatives could not bring the action
until death occurred, so that the statute of limitations should begin to run at death, not sooner. For this
reason ... a good many courts who are not constrained by specific statutory commands have held that
the wrongful death suit may be maintained even after the personal injury action on which it is based has
expired." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 818 (2000).
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powers. While the Mississippi Supreme Court has spoken in Jenkins, the
Court's say is not necessarily final. For the first fifty years after the original
enactment of the wrongful death statute in Mississippi, the statute explicitly
provided for a one-year limitations provision which accrued upon the death
of the injured person. In the wake of Jenkins, the Mississippi Legislature
should affirmatively take the necessary steps to amend the wrongful death
statute, and in so doing the Legislature should provide the statute with its
own limitations period, be it one, two, or three years, but mandate that the
limitations period begins to run upon the death of the injured person. By
amending the statute, the legislature will assure the people of Mississippi
that Jenkins was an anomaly, and it will restore certainty and predictability
to an area of the law where it is desperately needed.
The dye has been cast, and the ball is now in the Legislature's court.
Should the Legislature fail to act, unnecessary and ancillary litigation will
arise in cases in which the date upon which the injury accrued is uncertain.
Furthermore, as a result of the Jenkins and Cleveland decisions, the validity
of many of the Supreme Court's decisions which relied upon the holding
that wrongful death actions accrued upon death in favor of the named stat-
utory beneficiaries is left to question. Specifically, it is now uncertain as to
how a claim for wrongful death may be preserved in the event the injured
person does not die within the one, two, or three-year limitations period.
Additionally, in light of Cleveland, the issues of whether a person may cir-
cumvent the wrongful death statute through his testamentary will or pre-
nuptial agreement have arisen anew. In order to squelch the uncertainty
which Jenkins and Cleveland have brought to this area of the law, it is im-
perative that the Legislature take action to ensure that all wrongful death
beneficiaries will be able to enforce the rights which the Legislature has
bestowed upon them.
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